Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 49
Issue 1 January 2016

Article 5

2016

Stopping the Circling Vultures: Restructuring a Solution to
Sovereign Debt Profiteering
Elisa Beneze

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Elisa Beneze, Stopping the Circling Vultures: Restructuring a Solution to Sovereign Debt Profiteering, 49
Vanderbilt Law Review 245 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol49/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Stopping the Circling Vultures:
to
Solution
a
Restructuring
Sovereign Debt Profiteering
ABSTRACT

When a sovereign state becomes unable to repay its debts
and enters into default, an ideal outcome involves a quick and
mutually agreeable resolution with creditors, allowing the
country to reenter the international markets and continue its
recovery with limited impediments. However, the situation in
Argentina, unfolding since 2001, has provided a stark example
of why change is needed at the domestic and internationallevel
to address the growing problem of vulture funds'presence in the
sovereign debt markets. These aggressive hedge funds have
demonstrated an uncanny ability to hijack the sovereign debt
restructuringprocess. Vulture funds purchase discounted debt
on the secondary market and pursue private litigation against
sovereign states in an attempt to recover large profits off the
sovereign default. The vulture funds' actions pose significant
threats to the sovereign debt restructuringprocess. These threats
are poised to continue if steps are not taken to limit the funds'
power.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sovereign defaults are inevitable occurrences, especially for
developing and emerging economies. 1 Defaults are rarely sudden
events but rather are many years in the making-generally resulting
from a series of ill-conceived economic policy decisions and larger
global economic instability. 2 Argentina alone has defaulted eight
times throughout its history, most recently in 2001. 3 It went through
a related technical default in 2014-triggered by U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York Judge Thomas Griesa's
decision to prohibit Argentina's repayment to restructured
bondholders until the creditors who had refused to participate in
restructuring (holdouts) were also paid. 4 The Great Recession, which
played a role in the Argentine crisis, has also caused a marked
increase in the frequency with which countries are forced into default.
However undesirable and unfortunate it may be, a sovereign
state may at some point be unable to repay its obligations to its
creditors. 5 The best hope in such a situation is that the sovereign
state will be able to reach a compromise with its creditors and
restructure its debt, offering a reduced return on the creditors'
original investment (or a "haircut"). Restructuring the debt allows the
state to recover from the default and reenter the international capital
market. In the past, this process has been a fairly reliable cycle that
balances the interests of the creditors in maximizing repayment with
the interests of the sovereign state in being able to continue to
provide essential services to its citizens and return to the
6
international capital market as soon as possible.
However, in recent years, the prevalence of "vulture funds"hedge funds that purchase distressed debt at a deep discount only to
demand full repayment after the country has defaulted and
restructured most of its debt-has been steadily increasing. 7 Vulture
funds often use litigation and aggressive pursuit of sovereign assets

See J. F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41029, ARGENTINA'S
1.
DEFAULTED SOVEREIGN DEBT: DEALING WITH THE "HOLDOUTS" 4 (2013).
See, e.g., id. at 2.
2.
Argentina Defaults: Eighth Time Unlucky, ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2014),
3.
2
http://www.economist.comnewsleaders/ 1610263-cristina-fern-ndez-argues-her(archived
[http://perma.cc/T84K-TDT5]
countrys-latest-default-different-she-missing
Oct. 11, 2015).
Id.
4.
HORNBECK, supra note 1, at 4.
5.
Nouriel Roubini, From Argentina to Greece: Crisis in the Global
6.
Architecture of Orderly Sovereign Debt Restructurings, ROUBINI GLOB. ECON. (Nov. 28,
2012), http://www.mauldineconomics.com/images/uploads/overmyshoulder/analysis-c30
15acd70d3a58f259057daeba2leb5.pdf [http://perma.cc/7CT5-HRL4] (archived Oct. 11,
2015).
HORNBECK, supra note 1, at 8.
7.
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to accomplish their goals. 8 The entrance of these types of vulture
funds onto the sovereign debt scene has unsettled what was
previously a fairly stable and predictable process of default followed
by restructuring and recovery. 9 In the past, funds that refused to
participate in restructuring and demanded full repayment were
merely an annoyance to the sovereign state and had limited leverage
to force full repayment if they refused to take part in the
restructuring process. 10 This all changed drastically, however,
following Judge Griesa's recent ruling that the pari passu clause 1 ' of
the sovereign bond agreement should be interpreted to mean that
Argentina cannot make any payments to bondholders who had
previously restructured their debt as part of the 2005 and 2010 bond
exchanges unless the country also repaid the holdout funds in full at
12
the same time.
This ruling has threatened to seriously disrupt the sovereign
debt restructuring process, especially considering that many, if not
most, sovereign bond agreements include a clause giving jurisdiction
to New York courts, regardless of the nationality of the parties. 13 The
ruling caused immediate problems for Argentina-forcing the country
into technical default in August of 2014, despite Argentina's
continued ability and willingness to repay the vast majority of its
bondholders. 14 However, the ramifications of the ruling extend far
beyond the borders of Argentina.
In Part II, using the Argentine default and subsequent U.S.
District Court ruling as a framework, this Note will discuss the role of
holdout funds in the Argentine default and sovereign defaults in
general. Part III will analyze the implications of the vulture funds'
litigation tactics and the U.S. district court ruling in their favor, both
within Argentina and beyond. Part IV will discuss three solutions,
none of which are mutually exclusive. First, the Argentine
presidential election in fall 2015 opened the door for the country to
finally reach a resolution to this saga. The newly elected president,
Mauricio Macri, has reopened talks with the vulture funds through a
mediator. Second, the U.S. Congress has the opportunity to provide

8.
Id.
9.
Id. at 12.
10.
Roubini, supra note 6, at 5.
11.
A pari passu clause is common in most sovereign debt instruments and
translates literally to "with equal step." Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu
Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments: Developments in Recent Litigation, 72 BIS
PAPERS 121, 121 (2013). Pari passu refers to the concept that no debt should be made
subordinate to other debt. See id. at 123 (explaining pari passu in the context of the
Argentine sovereign debt litigation).
12.
Roubini, supranote 6.
W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U.
13.
ILL. L. REV. 67, 69 (2014).
14.
Argentina Defaults: Eighth Time Unlucky, supranote 3.
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better protection against vulture funds for developing and emerging
economies like Argentina that act in good faith to repay bondholders
but are held hostage by a small number of creditors. Third and most
importantly, the Note will address how the Argentine situation has
reemphasized the need for a better international framework to deal
with sovereign debt defaults and suggests an increased use of
international arbitration under the United Nations.
A growing number of sovereign states are facing default
following the Great Recession. With the novel legal interpretation of
the pari passu clause by the District Court of the Southern District of
New York and the increased prevalence of vulture hedge funds,
sovereign debt has reached a turning point. The international
community faces a stark need for a new approach to sovereign
defaults and restructuring.

II. VULTURE FUNDS: FEEDING OFF OF THE CARCASS OF ARGENTINA'S
SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS

Due to an unfortunate combination of years of questionable
domestic economic policies, a growing global recession, and perverse
incentives for high-risk lending, Argentina suffered rampant inflation
quickly followed by a devastating default on the country's sovereign
debt in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 15 Argentina's stunning default
on $82 billion of debt in December 2001 was the single largest
sovereign debt default in history up to that point. 16 However, that
dubious distinction was later taken over by Greece, when it defaulted
on $138 billion in 2012.17 Among others, Jamaica and Ecuador also
saw large defaults in the 2000s, though both were thoroughly
overshadowed by the massive scale of the Argentine and Greek
18
defaults.
Seeing an opportunity for profit in the midst of the Argentine
crisis, vulture funds began purchasing the deeply devalued Argentine
debt, even after it became clear that the country would be forced to
default. 19 The term vulture fund is generally used to describe hedge
funds whose strategy involves purchasing debt on the secondary
market at deeply discounted rates, refusing restructuring deals, and
then pursuing litigation to demand full repayment on the original

HORNBECK, supra note 1, at 2-3.
15.
Id. at 1.
16.
Daniel Huang, Don't Cry for Them: The World's Biggest Sovereign Defaults
17.
Since 2000, WALL ST. J. BLOG (July 2, 2014, 1:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.coml
moneybeat/2014/07/02/dont-cry-for-them-the-worlds-biggest-sovereign-defaults-since2000/ [http://perma.cd7TX4-HEA8] (archived Oct. 11, 2015).
18.
Id. (valuing Ecuador's default at $3.2 billion in 2008, and Jamaica's at $7.9
billion in 2010).
HORNBECK, supranote 1, at 4.
19.
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value of the bond, with the possibility of massive profits. 20 On
average, these types of funds see returns of between three and twenty
21
times the amount they originally invested on the discounted bonds.
Vulture funds, as the name implies, tend to target financially
distressed countries-particularly countries likely to default in the
near future. 22 Vulture funds also tend to be extremely tenacious and
aggressive, as well as patient, in pursuing repayment, making
resolution of conflicts more protracted-and thus more costly and
23
difficult.
Argentina first began the debt restructuring process in 2002
with the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but was
unable to reach a viable solution to repay its creditors. 2 4 Abandoning
its previous attempts, Argentina decided to act independentlywithout the IMF's help and thus without requiring the IMF's
approval-and opened a bond exchange. 25 The exchange was
ultimately very successful in restructuring over 75 percent of the old
bonds. 2 6 The exchange involved a fairly large haircut, resulting in a
66 percent reduction on the bond repayments to creditors. 2 7 After the
first bond exchange, $18.6 billion in debt remained un-exchanged,
along with $6.3 billion owed to Paris Club countries and $9.5 billion
owed to the IMF. 2 8 Argentina was eventually successful in repaying
the debt to the IMF in full and made plans to repay the Paris Club
countries as well. 2 9 The majority of the debt left in flux was that owed
to the holdouts that had turned down the opportunity to participate
in the bond exchange in hopes of forcing Argentina to repay on terms
30
more favorable to creditors.
In 2006, a group of Italian debt holders requested arbitration to
settle their dispute over the restructuring with the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 31 Since 2006,

20.
"Vulture Funds," JUBILEE USA NETWORK, http://www.jubileeusa.org
ourwork/vulturefunds.html [http://perma.ccIGFQ7-XD77] (archived Oct. 11, 2015).
21.
John Muse-Fisher, Starving the Vultures: NML Capital v. Republic of
Argentina and Solutions to the Problem of Distressed-Debt Funds, 102 CAL. L. REV.
1671, 1674 (2014).
22.
"Vulture Funds," supra note 20.
23.
John A. E. Pottow, Mitigating the Problem of Vulture Holdout:
InternationalCertification Boardsfor Sovereign-Debt Restructurings, 49 TEX. INT'L L.J.
221, 225 (2014).
24.
HORNBECK, supra note 1, at 5.
25.
Id. at 5; Marcus Miller & Dania Thomas, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
The Judge, the Vultures and CreditorRights, 30 THE WORLD ECON. 1491, 1491 (2007).
26.
Miller & Thomas, supra note 25, at 1498.
27.
Id.
28.
HORNBECK, supra note 1, at 5.
29.
Id.
30.
Id. at 8.
31.
Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign
Debt Disputes, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 335. 335 (2006).
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two more groups have filed similar requests, and, in all three cases,
the tribunal found that the claims were admissible under the ItalyArgentina bilateral investment treaty.3 2 However, these arbitrations
33
have largely stalled or have been abandoned.
In 2009, the Argentine legislature began taking steps to offer a
new bond deal in hopes of exchanging its remaining debt and finally
reentering the international capital market. 34 The 2010 bond offer
was again highly successful-resulting in the exchange of 68 percent
of the remaining debt, which meant the total success rate between
35
the 2005 and 2010 exchanges was ultimately over 91 percent.
Generally, under normal circumstances, once a country has
exchanged at least 90 percent of its debt following a default, the
restructuring process is deemed successful, and the country is
allowed to participate in international bond markets. 3 6 However,
even with the successful exchange of over 90 percent of its debt, this
37
has not been the case for Argentina.
Despite the vast participation of most of the bondholders in the
largely successful bond exchange programs, one of the holdout funds,
NML Capital, declined to participate and instead brought suit
against Argentina in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York. 3 8 NML argued that the pari passu clause in the original
bond document should be interpreted to prohibit Argentina from
repaying debt to the over 90 percent of creditors who participated in
the bond exchanges unless it also fully repays the holdout funds at
39
the same time.

See Alemanni Tribunal Unanimous That Collective Claim in ICSID
32.
Arbitration Against Argentina Can Continue, ALLEN & OVERY (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://www.aHlenovery.com/news/en-gb/articles/Pages/Alemanni-tribunal-unanimousthat-collective-claim'in'IC SID-arbitration-againstArgentinacan-cntinueaspx [http://
perma.cc/7QU8-CLEF] (archived Oct. 11, 2015) (discussing the unique nature of the
arbitration because it was brought by a class of over 60,000 parties).

33.

Diego Brian Gosis, Investment Arbitration of Financial Claims: The

Uncharted Crossroads of Two Trodden Paths, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Sep. 2015),
http://www.financierworldwide.com/investment-arbitration-of-financial-claims-the[http://perma.cc/PSA6uncharted-crossroads-of-two-trodden-paths/#.VfMsy2RViko
2BUF] (archived Oct. 11, 2015).
HORNBECK, supra note 1, at 7.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
A Good Week for Some Investors, ECONOMIST (June 21, 2014),
38.
2
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/ 1604612-vulture-funds-win-legal-victory[http://perma.cc/RR72-JAD3]
over-argentinas-government-good-week-some-investors
(archived Oct. 11, 2015) (discussing the implication of the pari passu clause).
Id.
39.
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This suit, however, was not the first time vulture funds have
40
pursued litigation in American courts to recover on defaulted bonds.
In fact, Paul Singer, who runs NML Capital, successfully executed a
nearly identical strategy against Peru in the 1990s. 4 1 Mr. Singer's
fund purchased $20.7 million worth of defaulted Peruvian loans for
only $11.4 million and then sued in the New York courts for the full
amount of the original loan plus interest, eventually winning a $58
million settlement, a staggering return rate of 400 percent. 42
Additionally, similar lawsuits were filed by other vulture funds in
43
Liberia in 2009, as well as in Cameroon and Zambia.
In contrast, a few years later, when Greece surpassed
Argentina's record for the largest sovereign debt default, the country
had greater success in its restructuring process. 4 4 Unlike Argentina,
Greece passed domestic legislation that made the debt-restructuring
offer compulsory for all bondholders if it gained the approval of twothirds of creditors. 4 5 But Greece did not rely solely on the legal
compulsion of the legislation-which was only applicable to
domestically held bonds-it also offered large incentives for creditors
to participate by providing an "unusually high cash pay-out. ' 46 While
Greece has also experienced a continuing debt crisis, it is due to
larger economic factors rather than the actions of a few stubborn
47
holdout creditors.
In the highly contentious Argentine litigation, the New York
District Court granted a permanent injunction in 2012 that prevented
Argentina from making payments to bondholders who participated in
the exchange without also making payments to vulture funds. 48 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision, and the
Supreme Court declined to hear Argentina's appeal in June 2014. 49

40.
See
Vulture Fund Case
Studies, JUBILEE
USA NETWORK,
http://www.jubileeusa.org/vulturefunds/vulture-fund-country-studies.html
[http://perma.cc/Z5S4-MCC5] (archived Oct. 11, 2015).
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring:An Autopsy, 28
ECON. POL'Y 513, 515-16 (2013) (crediting success in part to the use of novel legal
techniques); John Geddie & Marius Zaharia, Greek Debt Better Shielded from Vultures
Than Argentina's, REUTERS (July 3, 2015, 8:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015107/03/euro-zone-greece-vultures-idUSL8NZI23B20150703 [http://perma.cc/82KE.
EGQE] (archived Oct. 11, 2015) (discussing the use of collective action clauses in Greek
bond instruments).
45.
Zettelmeyer, supranote 44, at 517.
46.
Id.
47.
Greece's Debt Crisis Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015[business/international/greece-debt-crisis-euro.html
[http://perma.cc/7VME-ECXY] (archived Oct. 11, 2015).
48.
Muse-Fisher, supranote 21, at 1690.
49.
Ken Parks, Argentina Sues U.S. in InternationalCourt of Justice over Debt
Dispute, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2014, 6:26 PM), http://www.wsj.comlarticles/argentina-
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The decision in this case holds particular weight. In addition to ruling
in favor of the holdout funds, the court also threatened to hold anyone
who attempts to assist Argentina in continuing payment to the
restructured bondholders (i.e., U.S. financial institutions) in contempt
of court, making it almost impossible for Argentina to ignore the
court's order. 5 0 Due to the ongoing litigation and the court order
preventing any repayment of restructured debt, Argentina was forced
into a technical, or "selective," default in August 2014 and, as a
result, remains unable to participate in international markets and
51
return to normalcy.
Following its successful litigation, NML Capital took some
interesting steps to recover the debt owed to it by Argentina under
Judge Griesa's order, even going so far as to seize an Argentine naval
vessel.5 2 The boat, a training ship named the ARA Libertad, was
docked in Ghana when NML successfully obtained an injunction from
the government of Ghana allowing seizure of the vessel. 53 Argentina
disputed the legality of the seizure in the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea, securing the eventual return of the ship, with
much fanfare, to Argentina. 54 However, the fund's seizure of the boat
raised fears of additional attempts to seize Argentine property and
prompted the government to ground the presidential plane, Tango 01,
temporarily replacing it with a leased jet. 55 These aggressive seizure
techniques do not appear to be aimed at actually recovering
significant assets, but rather are meant to send a message that the

sues-u-s-in-international-court-of-justice-over-debt-dispute-1407431003
[http://perma.cc/
ZUJ8-3Z6P] (archived Oct. 11, 2015).
50.
See A Good Week for Some Investors, supra note 38 (explaining that many
of the current trustees of the debt are American banks, who will be unwilling to risk
being held in contempt of the court).
51.
See HORNBECK, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that in spite of the high bond
exchange participation rate, the remaining untendered bonds presented a problem for
Argentina given ongoing litigation).
52.
See Joe Weisenthal, A Hedge Fund Has Physically Taken Control of a Ship
Belonging to Argentina's Navy, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 4, 2012), http://
www.businessinsider.comhedge-fund-elliott-capital-management-seizes-ara-libertadship-owned-by-argentina-2012- 10 [http://perma.cc[M9AU-MJ2W] (archived Oct. 11,
2015) (providing the background of the ship's seizure and its connection to Argentina's
legal battle with Elliot Capital Management-of which NML Capital is a subsidiary).
53.
Id.
54.
See Ed Stocker, Argentina Welcomes Home Ship Held in Ghana by US
'Vulture Fund,' INDEPENDENT (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/worldlamericas/argentina-welcomes-home-ship-held-in-ghana-by-us-vulture-fund8445151.html [http://perma.cc/KK2Y.HFCD] (archived Oct. 11, 2015) (explaining how
the ship was returned).
55.
See Celina Andreassi, Government to Hire Plane to Avoid Seizure of Tango
01 on Asia Trip, ARGENTINA INDEPENDENT, (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.argentina
independent.com/currentaffairs/newsfromargentina/government-to-hire-plane-t-avoidseizure-of-tango-01-on-asia-trip/ [http://perma.cc/SC88-DNCF] (archived Oct. 11, 2015)
(explaining that the government hired a private jet to fly Argentina's President so as to
avoid capture of the official presidential jet, Tango 01, by "vulture funds").
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vulture funds will create a nuisance and not stop their pursuit until
their claims are fully satisfied.
After the court ruling requiring repayment to the holdouts under
the pari passu clause, Argentina offered the holdouts a repayment at
essentially the same rates that it offered to other bondholders during
previous exchanges. 56 This deal was estimated to result in a return of
$120.6 million to the holdouts, a substantial increase from their
original investment of only $48.7 million. 57 Surprisingly, or perhaps
58
unsurprisingly, the holdouts rejected the proposal.

III. ARGENTINA'S

FIFTEEN YEAR (AND COUNTING) DEBT CRISIS

A. The $100 Billion Catch-22
Argentina remains at an impasse. By continuing to refuse to deal
with holdout funds, Argentina is still locked into a technical default
and is unable to raise capital on the international markets due to the
threat of seizure under Judge Griesa's order. 59 However, if Argentina
acquiesced to the holdouts, it risked encouraging more copycat
lawsuits by other holdouts. Even more devastating, up until the end
of 2014, any creditor who took a haircut in one of the bond exchanges
could have demanded full repayment due to a "Rights Upon Future
Offers" (RUFO) clause in Argentine law. Fortunately for Argentina,
these RUFO clauses expired at the end of 2014.60 Both paths would
lead to unsavory economic consequences for Argentina. 61
Additionally, Argentina passed legislation, a "lock law," that bars any

See Muse-Fisher, supra note 21, at 1692-93 ("The proposed payment
56.
formula essentially followed the payment structure accepted by exchange bondholders
in 2013.").
57.
See id. at 1715 ("In its filing, Argentina speculated NML Capital
purchased the bonds for approximately $48.7 million, and Argentina's payment scheme
would entitle the fund to $120.6 million-a fairly impressive return by any standard.").
58.
See id. at 1693 (noting that the holdouts ultimately rejected the proposal in
April 2013).
59.
See id. at 1695 (noting that Argentina's inability to raise money in
traditional sovereign debt marks since 2002, the year of its default, is partially because
any efforts to raise funds would result in seizure by holdout creditors under the terms
of Judge Griesa's order).
60.
See Argentina's 'Vulture Fund' Crisis Threatens Profound Consequencesfor
InternationalFinancialSystem, UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?
OriginalVersionID=783&Sitemap-x0020_Taxonomy=UNCTAD%2OHome [http://perma
.cc/Z8RN-C93Y] (archived Oct. 11, 2015) (noting the impact of the Rights upon Future
Offer's Clause on Argentine law and how two hedge fund-friendly U.S. holdings could
lead to future Argentine bond requests).
61.
See id. (noting that, under RUFO, if Argentina were to pay the holdout
bond holders, it would have to extend full payment to the bondholders of the 2005 or
2010 debt swaps at an estimated cost of over U.S. $120 billion).
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further attempts to offer deals to holdout creditors. 6 2 However, this
restriction was lifted in order to initiate the 2010 bond exchange, and
63
it could potentially be lifted again, if necessary.
Though it is unlikely Argentina will face economic consequences
that rise to the level of the 2000-2002 economic crisis, the actions of
the vulture funds and the ruling by the U.S. court have undoubtedly
pushed Argentina into a deeper recession. 6 4 Despite good faith efforts
and considerable success in staying current on repayment of nearly
all of its debt, Argentina remains locked out of international markets
and faced censure by the IMF when it was forced into technical
default in 2014.65 In a catch-22, Argentina would potentially have
been liable for the entire sum of its original debt to all of the creditors
who restructured in the earlier bond exchanges if forced to repay the
vulture funds in whole. 66 This threat dissipated when the RUFO
clauses expired at the end of 2014. Some argue that Argentina merely
used the specter of the RUFO clauses as an excuse not to deal with
the holdouts. 67 Many, though not all, of the creditors who
participated in the bond exchanges had agreed to waive the RUFO
clauses to allow Argentina to negotiate more freely with the holdout
funds. 6 8 Though the potential waiver deal never materialized, the
expiration of the clauses at the end of 2014 removed at least one of
the more dire consequences Argentina would have faced if it had

62.
See id. ("The Congress of Argentina passed a law in February 2005 that
forbade the Government to make payments on any bonds not tendered, to later reopen
the exchange or to settle with non-participating creditors one by one on the side.").
63.
See HORNBECK, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that as part of the new bond
exchange process, the Argentine legislature temporarily suspected the "Lock Law" on
November 18, 2009).
64.
See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Argentina Accuses US of Judicial
Malpractice for Triggering Needless Default, TELEGRAPH
(Jul 31, 2014),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/11004486/Argentina-accuses-US-ofjudicial-malpractice-for-triggering-needless-default.html
[http://perma.cc/BY45-ASX4]
(archived Oct. 11, 2015) (explaining that the New York court's actions have pushed the
Argentine state into default, which in turn will push the country into a deeper
recession).
65.
See Jude Webber, Argentina Proposes New Debt Swap, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d809c45a-6elb-1le2-983d-00144feab
49a.html#axzz3RwjSgKb8 [http://perma.cc/N99H-5FGC] (archived Oct. 11, 2015)
(discussing the possibility of reopening the bond exchanges in light of the U.S. Court
rulings in favor of the holdout funds).
66.
See id. ("The judge said the clause required payment in one lump sum to
the holdouts at the same time as when holders of restructured debt are paid.").
67.
See Nicole Hong & Matt Wirz, Bondholders in Talks with Argentina on
Legal Strategies, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 4, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bondholdersin-talks-with-argentina-on-legal-strategies- 1409867227
[http://perma.cc/267Q-K2K4]
(archived Oct. 11, 2015) ('The holdout creditors have said Argentina is using the RUFO
clause as a distraction and an excuse to avoid a settlement.").
68.
See id. (discussing how some hedge funds that own restructured Argentine
bonds are offering to waive the RUFO clause and are trying to get other bondholders to
do the same).
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69
struck a deal or agreed to pay back the holdout funds in full.
However, the acrimony of the proceedings meant that even without
the RUFO clauses in place, former President Cristina Fernandez de
Kirchner was unwilling to offer an amount that would satisfy the
vulture funds.
Following the district court decision, Argentina, mostly for show,
attempted to take the United States to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), accusing the United States of judicial malpractice for
allowing courts to aid the vulture funds in their sovereign debt
profiteering. 70 However, the United States would have had to consent
to jurisdiction in order for the ICJ to hear the case, which was
incredibly unlikely. 7 1 Though President Kirchner likely knew the suit
was futile, she may have hoped that it would position Argentina
favorably for some other diplomatic solution in the future. 72
Argentina has received the support of many of its fellow Latin
American countries in its protracted battle with the vulture funds,
including the Organization of American States, which met in July of
2014 to show its support for Argentina and stressed the need for a
73
better international system for restructuring debt.
President Kirchner and her administration were also fairly vocal
with strong reactions to the holdouts and the court decision,
comparing the conflict to Israel's battle with Gaza and referring to
Judge Griesa's decision as an act of violence against the Argentine
people. 74 The Argentine Economic Minister referred to the holdout
funds as the "Ebola of the international financial system." 7 5 Kirchner

See id. (noting that the clause expires at the end of 2014).
69.
See Evans-Pritchard, supra note 64 (discussing Argentina's threat to take
70.
the United States to the International Court of Justice).
See Ken Parks, Argentina Sues U.S. in International Court of Justice over
71.
Debt Dispute, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/argentina-sues-us-in.international-court-of-justice-over-debt-dispute-1407431003 [http://perma.cc/EL5UKCUD] (archived Oct. 11, 2015) (noting that the United States is unlikely to accept
jurisdiction given that this has only happened in twenty-two cases since the tribunal
began working in 1946).
72.
See id. (speculating that that the Kirchner administration probably knew
the futility of inviting suit).
See Press Release, Organization of American States, Meeting of
73.
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS Supports Argentina in the
3,
2014, http://www.oas.org/
debt July
of its sovereign
Restructuring
[http://perma.cc/E5KY-VTX4]
enmedia center/press-release.asp?sCodigo=E-286/14
(archived Oct. 11, 2015) (discussing the Organization of American States' Declaration,
which expressed "its support to the Argentine Republic so that it can continue to meet
its obligations, pay its debt, honor its financial commitments and . . . arrive at a fair,
equitable and legal arrangement with 100% of its creditors").
74.
See Jamila Trindle, Preventing the Next Argentina, FOREIGN POLICY (Sep.
11, 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/11/preventing-the-next-argentina/ (discussing
President Kirchner's characterization of the investors who took the Argentine
government to court as "vultures").
Jonathon Gilbert, Debt Dispute Between Hedge Funds and Argentina at
75.
Impasse, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 5, 2015), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/O1/
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essentially refused to acknowledge that the country had been forced
into default, stating that the failure to pay bondholders, because the
court forced it, is not a default. 7 6 Such heightened rhetoric only
reinforced the unlikelihood of a deal being reached while the Kirchner
government was still in power.
B. Ramifications Beyond Argentina
The implications of the U.S. court ruling and the subsequent
technical default will be felt far beyond the Argentine economy. The
vulture fund's actions and the ruling have raised concerns about the
erosion of sovereign immunity. 7 7 In response to the ruling, the
Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations expressed concerns, which
were echoed at the Organization of American States' July 2014
meeting, that the vulture funds and the court ruling have negatively
impacted Argentina's ability to provide education, health care, and
other vital services to its citizens, and that the ruling will have a
lasting impact on employment and poverty levels for the Argentine
78
people.
While, until fairly recently in history, a country like Argentina
would have had full sovereign immunity from the NML Capital
lawsuit or similar litigation, it has since become more common for
sovereign debt bond agreements to include a waiver of sovereign
immunity. 79 Just over fifty years ago, suing a sovereign state in a
court of law to enforce a bond contract would have been an impossible
task, as sovereign immunity provided a "nearly insurmountable
barrier" to such suits.80 The barrier to a lawsuit against a sovereign
state was so insurmountable that even if a country had waived its
immunity in its bond contract, a court could still refuse to hear the
case for lack of jurisdiction.8 1 However, throughout the twentieth
century, a variety of treaty, statutory, and non-statutory actions
taken by nations and international bodies have slowly been eroding
the notion of sovereign immunity, particularly in relation to sovereign

05/debt-dispute-between-argentina-andhedge-funds-at-impasse?_r=O [http:lperma.ccl
HL7G-BL7W] (archived Oct. 11, 2015).
76.
Trindle, supranote 74.
77.
See Argentina's 'Vulture Fund' Crisis, supra note 60 ("The ruling does not
only impact the financial service providers involved, it also severely erodes sovereign
immunity and is not in compliance with the United States Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act.").
78.
See Press Release, Organization of American States, supra note 73
(describing the comments of Minister of Foreign Relations of Argentina, Hctor
Timerman).
79.
See Weidemaier, supra note 13, at 73 (noting that up until the middle of
the twentieth century, even where the sovereign had previous consented to be sued and
waived its immunity, courts might still decline jurisdiction over a lawsuit).
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
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loan contracts. 82 In the United States, the true end to sovereign
immunity came in the form of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA), which "codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity"
and placed the responsibility of determining sovereign immunity with
the courts, instead of with the State Department, where it had
previously resided. 8 3 The FSIA further restricted sovereign immunity
by guaranteeing that a country would not be immune if it had
previously waived its immunity in a contract, thereby removing a
84
judge's ability to reinstate previously waived immunity.
While the district court in the Argentine case had sufficient
jurisdiction under the FSIA because of just such a waiver clause in
the Argentine bond contracts, the United States argued in its amicus
brief in support of Argentina that the injunction preventing
repayment to the bondholders was a violation of sovereign immunity
because it "constrain[ed] Argentina's use and disposition of sovereign
property that is immune from execution." 85 The brief expressed
additional concern regarding the potential adverse effects the court's
ruling could have on U.S. foreign relations. 86 Despite the recent
erosions of sovereign immunity, many believe the court's injunction
invaded the realm in which a sovereign state should be protected
from a private citizen's legal action.
C. Ruling Bad for Both Creditorsand Debtors
The court ruling has allowed for the use of litigation as an
enforcement method for a private hedge fund to force the repayment
of sovereign debt. However, it is unclear if this added power provides
much benefit in practice. Even in the absence of litigation and court
orders, sovereign states will still have an incentive to repay debts for
reputational reasons. 87 A sovereign state, with a much longer life
span than any individual person, will likely need to borrow from the
same creditors again and again in the future and risks informal
sanctions by those they do not repay.8 8 Additionally, while litigation
allows individual funds to receive a judgment against a sovereign

See id. at 74 (describing the actions taken by nations and international law
82.
bodies to erode sovereign immunity law and promote formal adjudication).
See id. at 78 (describing how the FSIA changed the law).
83.
84.
Id.
85.
Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 6, NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 892 F. Supp 2d. 530, No. 12105 (2d Cir. December 28, 2012).
86.
See id. at 7-8 (explaining how a holding constraining a foreign nation's use
of its property outside the United States could have adverse consequences for the
treatment of U.S. property under principles of reciprocity).
See Weidemaier, supra note 13, at 103 (discussing the incentives, both
87.
reputational and sanction-based, that sovereigns have to repay their debts).
Id.
88.
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state, enforcement remains difficult. 89 However, the FSIA also
provided more favorable remedies by removing immunity for foreign
assets used for commercial purposes within the United States,
thereby allowing for the execution of judgments.9 0 Prior to the NML
Capital decision, it was largely assumed that a judgment creditor
would only be able to recover if the sovereign state willingly paid. 91
In light of Judge Griesa's decision, however, this is no longer a safe
assumption, though Argentina has continued to refuse to pay, despite
the judgment.
There is, of course, an important balance maintained by making
restructuring a difficult process-creditors retain bargaining power
against the sovereign state, giving them a greater ability to protect
their rights. In some ways, the U.S. court ruling has only been a
disservice to creditors, pitting some creditors against each otherthose creditors who participated in the bond exchange against those
chose to holdout. 92 However, some argue that in fact, vulture fundsand their aggressive willingness to litigate against sovereign statesserve an important monitoring role in the sovereign debt
restructuring process. 93 Vulture funds-by refusing to participate in
an unfair restructuring process-can potentially serve to expose
94
mistreatment of creditors.
The court ruling in NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina also
caused a shift from the view that holdouts are merely a small
problem-like a tax-that sovereigns pay during the restructuring
process to a much larger problem: namely that the enhanced power
they hold can completely arrest the process. 95 Perhaps more
importantly, the court's ruling in favor of the vulture funds creates
perverse incentives for the holders of sovereign debt. Funds have
greater incentive to refuse to take part in the necessary process of

89.
See id. at 106 (noting that investors need more than a legal judgment but a
means to enforce it).
90.
See id. at 79 (noting that following FISA, property used for commercial
activity in the United States was "no longer immune from execution if the foreign
sovereign waived immunity from execution").
91.
See id. at 89 (explaining that it makes little sense for a financiallydistressed sovereign to pay a judgment voluntarily because the sovereign will need to
persuade individual bondholders to accept a restructuring plan, which may be
frustrated if individual creditors hold out for a better deal).
92.
See Roubini, supra note 6, at 7 ("[W]hile traditionally, inter-creditor
conflicts have pitted private creditors against official-sector creditors, we are now in a
situation where inter-creditor tensions occur even among official-sector ones.").
93.
See Pottow, supra note 23, at 232 (noting that policy proposals seeking to
curtail the ability of private funds to sue for enforcement of sovereign debt upon default
may not be wise because sometimes these funds do provide a valuable monitoring
function).
94.
See id. (noting the enforcement function of vulture funds).
95.
See Roubini, supra note 6, at 5 (noting the radical impact of Judge Griesa's
decision).
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restructuring debt following a default, even when the terms of the
restructuring are favorable. 96 But the ruling does more than simply
give future holdouts a greater chance of full recovery through
litigation, it also discourages funds that normally would not holdout
to do so with the knowledge that they could get more money by suing
than restructuring. Funds may also be hesitant to restructure
because of the risk that they may not get paid at all if a future court
hands down a similar injunction to the one in this case. 97 Those in
the global financial market, including the IMF, have expressed
serious concerns about the implications of the court's ruling in the
NML case, especially relating to the vastly increased leverage that
98
holdout funds now have during sovereign defaults.
One suggested method to prevent these types of lawsuits and
rulings in the future is to increase the use of collective action clauses
(CAO) in sovereign bond agreements, which would allow a majority of
bondholders to bind a dissenting minority to an agreement, thereby
99
preventing vulture funds from holding out in the first place.
However, there are countless bonds that currently exist without these
types of collective actions clauses, and in the event of default, funds
will be incentivized to holdout rather than participate in
100
restructuring where they will take a haircut on their returns.
The strict legal order handed down by the district court and
upheld by the U.S. court of appeals demonstrates the harmful impact
that can result from a court ruling that relies on rule of law and
textual interpretation, but fails to account for broader policy and
global economic ramifications when dealing with a complex issue that
typically falls outside of a domestic court's expertise. 101 Other
countries, including Grenada and the Democratic Republic of Congo,
subsequently faced litigation in U.S. courts initiated by holdout
investors who hoped that the ruling in the Argentine case would
benefit their attempts to recover a full repayment on defaulted bonds,

96.
See Argentina's 'Vulture Fund' Crisis, supra note 60 (noting that by
removing financial incentives for orderly debt workouts, the rulings will make future
debt restructuring even more difficult); Pottow, supra note 23, at 231 (noting the
increased incentive for holdouts as a result of naive legal outcomes).
97.
Id. at 230 ('The most troubling policy outcome with [NML v. Argentina] is
the perverse holdout incentive it creates by paying the holdouts more than the
cooperators.").
98.
Id. at 231 (noting the financial incentives for holding out).
99.
See Argentina's 'Vulture Fund' Crisis, supra note 60 (nothing different
sovereign debt workout mechanisms).
100.
See id. (noting that the existing Collective Action Clauses will take years to
expire).
101.
See Muse-Fisher, supra note 21, at 1678 (discussing the Argentine
experience where "strict adherence to the rule of law, a hallmark of modern
development theory, can actually undermine moral and economic concerns").

260

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49:245

10 2
a clear demonstration of the damaging effect beyond Argentina.
While on its face the court ruling seems pro-creditor, in reality it may
be the opposite. By incentivizing holding out, the ruling makes
restructuring less appealing to creditors, which raises the risk that
defaults will occur without the opportunity for an organized
restructuring deal. This result is good for neither the creditors nor
10 3
the debtors.
There is also a concern that the lack of an international
mechanism for resolving sovereign debt defaults leads to the use of
fragmented legal forums across states and nations, resulting in
inconsistent outcomes and less predictability. Such uncertainty could
cripple the restructuring process. In the wake of the Argentine crisis,
a lead economist at the IMF expressed concern that the Argentine
case is going to cause much more uncertainty in future sovereign
defaults and restructuring attempts. 10 4 Despite the problems with
such fragmented adjudication, there remains a roadblock stemming
from the unwillingness of countries with major financial systems to
participate in a supranational adjudicatory body. 10 5 However, with
different courts in different countries handing down inconsistent
sovereign debt
interpretations
on key clauses integral to
restructuring, the entire process is plagued with uncertainty and will
undoubtedly lead to greater difficulty in restructuring sovereign debt
10 6
in the future.

IV. A CURE FOR THE VULTURE PROBLEM: A CALL FOR A SOLUTION AT
BOTH THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
A. A ChangingLandscape Makes Settlement More Likely
Since the issuance of Judge Griesa's ruling, Argentina has held
only a limited number of equally unattractive options, including
repaying the vulture funds in whole, attempting to reach a settlement
with the funds, or- moving all restructured bonds out of the United

102.
See Trindle, supra note 74 (highlighting the importance of a solution that
can keep poverty-ridden countries from further economic troubles).
See Roubini, supra note 6 (identifying the new serious risk that "orderly
103.
debt restructurings that are beneficial to both the sovereign debtor and its creditors
may unravel and fail" because creditors may now hold out).
104.
See Trindle, supra note 74 (warning that uncertainty in restructuring may
affect the global financial system).
105.
See id. (noting that eleven countries, including the United States, voted
against the UN resolution calling for an intergovernmental framework to arbitrate
debt disputes).
106.
See Argentina's 'Vulture Fund' Crisis, supra note 60 (noting the
fragmented nature of legal forums and the array of politics and special interest groups
that can influence the outcome of rulings).
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States in order to limit the U.S. courts' ability to force repayment to
the vulture funds. 107 Paying the vulture funds in full or moving the
restructured bonds out of the U.S. court's jurisdiction are both
infeasible. Argentina simply does not have the capital-or the
willingness-to repay the entire debt owed to the holdout funds, and
moving the restructured bonds to avoid U.S. jurisdiction would be
logistically impossible. 108 In fact, NML Capital actually filed
subpoenas in China in order to preemptively block any attempts by
Argentina to circumvent the New York district court injunction. 109
There are some stark political obstacles to a settlement deal
between Argentina and NML Capital, as well as the fear that any
deal struck with NML would trigger copycat lawsuits by other
holdout funds seeking a similar windfall. 1 10 In one bright spot for
Argentina, the RUFO clauses that would have allowed the creditors
who previously restructured in the two prior bond exchanges to
demand full repayment if Argentina repaid the holdouts in full
expired at the end of 2014 and removed one of the most serious
potential monetary liabilities previously faced by Argentina. 11 1 The
expiration of the RUFO clauses helps lessen the barriers to a
settlement with NML, which now seems to be the only viable option
112
for Argentina moving forward.
While President Kirchner was fairly adamant that Argentina
would not repay the vulture funds, newly elected President Macri has
already taken steps to reopen negotiations. 113 With a presidential
election in October 2015, Kirchner, though not up for re-election

107.
See A Good Week For Some Investors, supra note 38 (detailing Argentina's
"four ugly options").
108.
See id. (explaining that moving the bonds presents insurmountable
challenges because a majority of the creditors cannot hold assets under a foreign
jurisdiction, and any intermediary, e.g., the bank acting as current trustee, would be in
contempt of NY courts).
109.
See Davide Scigliuzzo, Elliot Unit Extends Legal Fight to China, REUTERS
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014108128/argentina-debt-subpoenasidUSL1NOQY2IO20140828 [http://perma.cc/V6VB-FTZ7] (archived Oct. 1, 2015)
(indicating that the subpoenas were in an effort to determine whether any of
Argentina's assets would surface in jurisdictions where NML Capital could attach
them).
110.
See A Good Week For Some Investors, supra note 38 (noting that pursing a
settlement would be seen as a complete reversal of President Kirchner's adamant
refusal to pay).
111.
See Evans-Pritchard, supra note 64 (explaining the enormity of the
liability that Argentina would face if restructured bond holders sought the same terms
as the holdout bond holders).
112.
See A Good Week For Some Investors, supra note 38 (identifying settlement
as the only viable, albeit "ugly option").
113.
See Gov't Restarts Talks with 'Vulture' Funds, BUENOS AIRES HERALD,
(Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/206654/govE2%8 0 /99trestarts-talks-with-%E2%80%98vultureE2%80%99-funds [http://perma.cc/T3G6-FESQ]
(archived Jan. 13, 2016) (stating that talks have resumed with high expectations that a
settlement will be reached).
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herself, may have been hesitant to strike any deal that would reflect
weakness on her political party in the face of the vulture funds and
hurt the party in the election. 114 However, President Macri-an
opposition candidate-took steps almost immediately upon assuming
office to "resolve all outstanding issues" by working with a mediator
in New York. 115 While neither side had an immediate incentive to
negotiate in 2015, the election provided an opportunity to finally
reach a settlement and move Argentina out of default. 1 16 President
Kirchner felt less pressure to settle with the holdouts as her term
wore on because Argentina was able to stabilize its reserves through
a currency swap with China, but high inflation and capital flight have
117
created an incentive for President Macri to negotiate.
President Kirchner offered to settle with NML at the same terms
as the 2005 and 2010 deals that the other bondholders accepted, plus
accrued interest, but the holdout funds determined that there is no
incentive to accept such terms and remained confident they would be
able to recover a greater amount by continuing to holdout. 118 The
funds' strategy may prove successful, as President Macri has already
expressed a greater willingness to do whatever it takes to move
Argentina out of default. 119 Ironically, Argentina saw some of the
highest returns on bonds in 2014, posting the second-best returns
among emerging markets, trailing only Turkey. 120 As Argentine
bonds have risen to their highest level in eight years, 12 1 President

114.

See Sonia Avalos, The New Year Could Resolve the Argentina Debt Debacle,

BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-new-year-couldresolve-argentine-debt-debacle-or-not-2014- 12 [http://perma.cc/HN7E.82EW] (archived
Oct. 1, 2015) ("Waiving the flag of 'the nation versus the vultures' has benefited the
government, and retreating a step could cost it dearly.").

115.

See Gov't Restarts Talks with 'Vulture'Funds,supra note 113 (noting that

this is already the third trip to New York for Finance Secretary Luis Caputo since
President Macri took office).
116.
See id. (quoting President Macri: "We don't want to remain listed as a
defaulter").
117.
See Gilbert, supra note 75 (disagreeing with the predictions of some
analysts that Argentina would budge because it needed "access to global debt markets
to increase foreign currency reserves"); Linette Lopez, Argentina Says It's Finally
Coming to the Table, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2016) (expressing some skepticism
about whether Argentina will stay at the table and reach a settlement).

118.

See Camila Russo, Argentina Bond Bulls Predict World-Beating 2015

Returns, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Jan. 6, 2015), http:/www.bloomberg.comnews/201501-06/argentina-bond-bulls-predict-world-beating-2015-returns.html
[http://perma.cc/
3APT-J9CW] (archived Oct. 1, 2015) (indicating that one of the candidates' likely
proposal for settlement will offer less than 100 percent, but more than the 2005 and
2010 debt swaps).
119.
See Lopez, supra note 117 (observing that President Macri "ran on a
platform of economic reform").
120.
See Russo, supra note 118 (noting that Argentine bonds "gained almost
three times the average 7.5 percent for developing nations").

121.
Argentine

See Charlie Devereux, How Dwindling Reserves are a Positive for
Bondholders,

Bloomberg

Business

(Sep.

7,

2015),
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Macri could use Argentina's stronger position in the market to offer
the best deal possible to the holdouts, but should avoid repaying the
full 100 percent so that he does not set a precedent that would
encourage future funds to refuse to participate in restructuring in
hopes of successfully recouping the full amount later.
B. A Chance to Revive CongressionalAction
Regardless of any settlement deal between Argentina and the
vulture funds, the U.S. Congress should take action to counteract
what some might consider an incorrect interpretation of the pari
passu clause by the courts. 12 2 In an amicus brief filed in the NML
appeal, the United States expressed concern regarding how the ruling
forces repayment to the vulture funds and stressed the importance of
cooperative solutions to sovereign debt crises. 123 In the brief, the
United States contended that the court's interpretation of the pari
passu clause "contradicts the settled market understanding" of such
clauses. 12 4 Further, the court's interpretation "threatens core U.S.
policy regarding international debt restructuring" and drastically
shifts incentives away from cooperation and towards hostile holdout
negotiations. 125 The brief also argued for the importance of a
sovereign state's ability to resist paying back creditors who do not
participate in the debt exchanges because it incentives cooperative
participation and quick resolutions. 126 Pari passu clauses in
sovereign bond contracts are generally boilerplate and are intended to
12 7
ensure that no creditor's debt is legally subordinate to another's.
The court's ruling, however, arguably produces the opposite effect,
giving the vulture funds' debt legal superiority to those creditors who
28
restructured their debt on the bond exchange. 1

http://www.bloomberg.com/newsfarticles/2015-09-08/how-dwindling-reserves-are-apositive-for-argentine-bondholders [http://perma.cc/WM2M-YQ6Y] (archived Oct. 1,
2015) ("Argentina's dollar-dominated bonds due in 2033 have risen to their highest
level in eight years.").
122.
See Stephen Lubben, Possible Ripples from the Argentine Bond Litigation,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2012), http:Ildealbook.nytimes.com/20 12/12/13/possible-rippleeffects-from-the-argentina-hedge-fund-court-fight/?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/57NL-6MF8]
(archived Oct. 1, 2015) (arguing that the pari passu clause might even be a vestigial
limb from corporate bonds that holds no significance in the sovereign debt setting).
123.
See Muse-Fisher, supra note 21, at 1690 (arguing that the lower court's
decision "could 'undermine the decades of effort the United States has expended to
encourage a system of cooperative resolution"').
124.
Brief for the United States of America, supra note 85 at *1.
125.
Id. at *3-4.
126.
See id. at *4.
127.
See Muse-Fisher, supra note 21, at 1713 (explaining that the pari passu
clause has been a feature of sovereign debt contracts since the 1970s, and is generally
regarded as "boilerplate").
128.
See id. (arguing that the "ratable payments" interpretation incentivizes
"sovereign piracy" because it is inconsistent with market expectations).
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In addition to the United States' amicus brief, both the New York
Clearing House Association and the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York have expressed similar concerns about the broad interpretation
of the pari passu clause as a means of debt repayment enforcement
through injunctive relief. 129 The court's approach in applying the pari
passu clause may have been a result of it being largely unfamiliar
with sovereign debt proceedings, an area that previously would have
been foreclosed because of sovereign immunity. 130 The outcome of the
NML litigation signals the need for Congress to step in and
appropriately limit vulture funds' ability to use U.S. courts to pursue
sovereign debtors.
To help remedy the situation and build stronger protections
moving forward, Congress should follow the example of the United
Kingdom and pass a law that regulates the vulture funds' use of the
domestic court system to demand repayment. The UK law, passed in
2010 and the first of its kind, focuses on preventing "harsh and
inequitable payments" forced through judicial action in the UK courts
and recognizes that a small number of vulture funds can have a
disproportionately large impact on developing countries during
sovereign debt proceedings. 13 1 After its initial implementation, a
review of the legislation's impact noted that it showed signs of
creating some benefit to developing countries without presenting any
evidence of adverse or unintended effects. 13 2 The UK law works by
placing a cap on the amount that any commercial creditor could
recover during a default involving a "Highly Indebted Poor Country"
(HIPC). 133 This cap creates a strong disincentive for funds to resist
participating in a restructuring process, since they know they will be
unable to seek exceptionally large profits by holding out. 134 While the
law in the United Kingdom only applies to about forty countries that
have been designated as HIPCs, the reality of the situation is that
vulture funds can and do take advantage of "emerging" countries like
Argentina or Greece, and their actions can be just as damaging, even

129.

See Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign

Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 299, 314 (2005) ("ITlhe U.S. government, the New York
Clearing House Associations, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York have
emerged as critics of this expansive definition of the pari passu provision.").
130.
See Pottow, supra note 23, at 230 (suggesting the court's interpretation
was unintentionally novel due to its lack of familiarity with the subject matter).
131.
Press Release, HM Treasury, Government Acts to Halt Profiteering on
Third
World
Debt
Within
the
UK
(May
16,
2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
governrment-acts-to-halt-profiteering-on.third
world-debt-within-the-uk [http://perma.cc/ F9VF-PZJF] (archived Oct. 1, 2015).
132.
See id. (enacting permanent legislation before the sunset date because the
evidence suggested that there was a benefit for HIPCs with no adverse effects).
133.
Id.
134.
See id. ("This Act will make sure that Vulture Funds will never again be
able to exploit the poorest countries in the world within the UK's courts.").
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to countries that do not qualify as HIPCs. 13 5 After twelve years of
being locked out of the international markets, Argentina was poised
to reenter, only to be thwarted by the vulture funds' litigation. 136 The
ability of a small minority of bondholders to hijack the debt
restructuring process after a vast majority agreed to its terms is a
13 7
clear sign that the process deserves the attention of lawmakers.
A bill proposed in the House of Representatives in 2008138 would
have criminalized "sovereign debt profiteering" but, like the UK law,
would only have applied to "qualified poor countries," which would
not include Argentina despite its tumultuous economic history
involving numerous sovereign defaults. The proposed bill expressed
concern that vulture funds were forcing repayment in amounts far
surpassing those repaid to regular creditors who participate in the
debt restructuring process. 139 The bill would have made it illegal for
vulture funds to use U.S. courts in furtherance of their sovereign debt
profiteering. 140 Such a bill, if expanded to all countries involved in a
sovereign default, could nullify the court's ability to force repayment
by Argentina to the vulture funds.
It would be important to include a limiting aspect of the bill, only
applying it to secondary creditors who purchase defaulted debt at a
discount, not to the original creditor. Because vulture funds purchase
distressed debt on the secondary market, this type of limitation
ensures that the caps on profits are tailored to those who purchased
debt with the intention of holding out to seek exorbitant returns that
vastly exceed the amount spent on the investment. 141
While the failed 2008 bill acknowledged the fundamental
differences between sovereign debt and individual debt from the
standpoint of debtor protections, it is also important to note the
different impacts of a sovereign default, where the losses affect public

135.
See Muse-Fisher, supra note 21, at 1696 (explaining that, unlike Zambia
and Liberia, Argentina does not qualify as an HIPC and thus would not be protected by
UK-like legislation).
136.
See HORNBECK, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that the litigation posed a
problem because the attachment orders allowed for "confiscation of proceeds from any
new international bond offer").
137.
See Pottow, supra note 23, at 223 (expressing concern that holdouts in this
situation could resist the supermajority consensus to engage in the bond exchanges
because there is no bankruptcy-like court).
138.
Stop VULTURE Funds Act, H.R. 6796, 110th Cong. (2008).
139.
H.R. 6796 § 2(7) ('The vulture creditors seek payments far in excess of the
rates of payment made to other similarly situated creditors .. .working through the
London Club mechanism of sovereign debt restructuring.").
140.
Id. § 5(a) ("In General.-- A court in or of the United States may not issues a
summons, subpoena, writ, judgement, attachment, or execution, in aid of a claim ...
which would be furthering sovereign debt profiteeting.").
141.
Id. § 3(1) (defining a "vulture creditor" as "any person who directly or
indirectly acquires defaulted sovereign debt at a discount to the face value of the
obligation").
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services like education, health care, and infrastructure. 142 Another
important difference between sovereign default and individual
bankruptcy is that in bankruptcy there is an ability to bind all the
bondholders to a deal, limiting the power of holdouts; such an option
does not currently exist for sovereign default proceedings in the
absence of CAC clauses. 14 3 While a bankruptcy court can reallocate a
debtor's assets to settle creditor claims, in a sovereign default, a court
can only enforce the bond contract-without consideration to fairness
across all creditors affected by the default. 144 Additionally, while the
common understanding in the investment world is that high risk
equals high reward, the combination of the erosion of sovereign
immunity and the litigation success of holdout funds in recent years
has reduced much of the risk for vulture funds participating in the
sovereign bond market, while still opening the door for excessive
reward. 145
Some argue that a bill foreclosing the litigation route for holdout
creditors is inappropriate, because litigation can be used to blow the
whistle on a sovereign's unfair treatment of creditors. 146 However,
such a bill does not prevent funds from refusing to take part in a
restructuring that they see as unfair; it simply limits the amount
they can profit if they choose to litigate instead of take part in the
restructuring process. If the sovereign's restructuring offer is truly
unfair, it is likely a fund could still recover higher amounts through
litigation, ensuring that the incentive to blow the whistle still exists.
Any fund is free to take on a high-risk bond, but if that risk does
not bear profit, then the fund should not be able to use a U.S. court to
demand a repayment far exceeding the original investment to profit
off a sovereign default-a default that, in all likelihood, the fund
anticipated when it purchased the debt. However, another criticism of
the bill is that it removes one of the core characteristics of the debt
market: that "obligations can be traded." 147 Critics believe that laws
limiting vulture fund profiteering through litigation will disincentive
the buying and selling of bonds on the secondary market and will
result in developing countries having less access to international

142.
See id. § 2(12).
See Pottow, supra note 23, at 221-22 (referring to collective action clauses
143.
that allow supermajorities to determine the repayment terms for all creditors).
See id. at 223 (quoting Judge Griesa) ("Unlike bankruptcy courts ... the
144.
court in this case is limited to enforcing the terms of the specific contracts before it.").
See Weidemaier, supra note 13, at 96 (discussing the role of FSIA in
145.
reducing the risk involved in investing in sovereign bonds by limiting sovereign
immunity).
See Pottow, supra note 23, at 235 (noting Judge Griesa's framing of
146.
Argentina as less of a victim and more of an "abusive ...juggernauto stampeding over
the rights of creditors").
See Felix Salmon, The Silly War on Vulture Funds, REUTERS (May 7,
147.
2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/05/07/the-silly-war-on-vulture-funds/
[http://perma.ccfWEW6-35FV] (archived Oct. 2, 2015).
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capital. 148 Meanwhile, the holdouts stand to receive unbelievable
returns on their investment, which raises the question of whether
that is a proper use of sovereign debt investment. 149 Many, if not
most, of the holdout bonds were purchased after it was clear that
Argentina would default, and some were even purchased as recently
as 2010, after the second bond exchange option. 150 Some of these
funds were purchased for as little as fifteen cents on the dollar, which
would mean that even a settlement that mirrored the terms of the
restructured debt in the bond exchanges would result in a high yield
for the holdout funds. 15 1 One proposed solution to rein in sovereign
debt profiteering through congressional action is to limit vulture fund
profits, perhaps by linking the amount awarded to the holdouts to the
country's gross domestic product, or as a percentage of trade
exports. 15 2 Alternatively, in the spirit of the pari passu clause that
the vulture funds relied on in their litigation seeking payment,
another option is to limit vulture fund repayment to the most
favorable rates offered under the initial bond exchange, thereby
ensuring true equal treatment for all creditors and fully
disincentivizing holding out.
Legislation limiting vulture fund recoveries is in part a step back
from the broad erosion of sovereign immunity that has occurred in
15 3
recent history, putting a small piece of protection back in place.
Providing a layer of protection for sovereign debtors against vulture
funds is not uncontroversial.154 However, the vulture fund's tactic of
attempting to seize an Argentine warship shows that the fund is not
necessarily interested in seizing assets to recover their judgment, but
rather using such tactics to bully the debtor country-and future
debtor countries-to settle in full. 155 Further, defending against a
vulture fund's seizure of assets presents its own costs, independent of
the repayment of bonds, putting further pressure on the debtor

148.
See id. (arguing that developing countries would not want legislation that
might hinder access to capital).
149.
See HORNBECK, supra note 1, at 12 (discussing the holdouts' potential for
large reward if their patience pays off with a settlement with Argentina).
150.
See Muse-Fisher, supra note 21, at 1689 (discussing the purchasing of
bonds on the secondary market).
151.
Id.
152.
Id. at 1699.
153.
See Pottow, supra note 23, at 224 (suggesting that vulture funds have in
part become a scapegoat for the financial crisis, though the blame is not entirely
unfounded).
154.
See id. at 223 (discussing the need for a sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism).
155.
See id. at 227 (positing that the value of the seized vessel was only one
percent of the value of NML's judgment against Argentina, making the act more for
show than actual recovery of assets).
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country to pay. in full rather than face litigation-not to mention the
costs that are external to the parties involved. 156

C. A PressingNeed for a Better InternationalFramework
Because the sovereign debt restructuring process lacks some of
the protections provided to private debtors during bankruptcy
proceedings, it creates an environment ripe for vulture funds to
engage in profiteering. 157 In a standard bankruptcy system, there is
an ability to bind all the parties to a restructuring solution, ensuring
fair outcomes for all creditors. 158 Courts involved in sovereign debt
litigation are more limited in their ability to allocate the debtor's
resources to satisfy all creditors, instead reacting on a creditor-bycreditor basis despite the existence of a larger restructuring
scheme. 159 Because of the limited resources and lack of experience of
most courts in sovereign default litigation, the court is often left with
no better option than to enjoin any repayment to other creditors
unless the holdouts' claims are satisfied, which is a less than ideal
outcome for most of the parties involved. 160 There is little precedent
16 1
to guide good policy-based court decisions.
Quick and mutually agreed-upon solutions to debt crises tend to
be more favorable to all those involved-both creditors and debtorsand should be encouraged and supported by the entities with the
power to do so. 16 2 While sovereign debt defaults are relatively rare,
and many do not rise to the levels of acrimony seen in the Argentine
case, the frequency with which they occur is only expected to
increase. There is a clear need for a better system in which to resolve
the conflicts between sovereign debtors and holdout funds. 163 While
the creation of such a framework would likely have no impact on
Argentina's need to find a resolution for the vulture funds in its
present default, this case has demonstrated the critical need for an
international debt restructuring mechanism to regulate the power of
164
vulture funds in future sovereign debt defaults.

See id. (discussing the costs of defending against NML's actions in the
156.
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea).
157.
Muse-Fisher, supra note 21, at 1708.
Pottow, supra note 23, at 222.
158.
See id (discussing the concerns of holdouts in sovereign debt proceedings).
159.
See id.
160.
Id. at 229.
161.
162.
See HORNBECK, supra note 1, at 12 (discussing the benefits of quick and
mutually agreed upon solutions to sovereign debt crises).
Pottow, supra note 23, at 223.
163.
See Muse-Fisher, supra note 21, at 1708 (discussing the effects of new
164.
solutions on the current litigation in Argentina).
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In December 2014, the United Nations voted to create an ad hoc
committee to discuss the creation of a new international legal
framework to deal with sovereign debt restructuring, providing a
prime opportunity to address this gap in the sovereign debt
restructuring process. 165 The proposal was supported by a vast
majority of countries, lead primarily by China and a coalition of
developing countries. 166 However, the United States, the United
16 7
The United
Kingdom, Germany, and Japan opposed 'the move.
venue
appropriate
not
the
was
Nations
States argued that the United
appropriately
more
work
such
that
and
for the creation of such a body
falls under the oversight of the IMF. 168 However, while the IMF has
clear advantages, it is unclear whether it is truly the best
organization to establish and operate an international restructuring
system because, as a creditor itself, it cannot be a truly neutral third
party in sovereign default proceedings. 169 In contrast, the United
Nations provides the best of both worlds; it allows a centralized body
that already holds a high level of international legitimacy to be a
neutral third party in overseeing the sovereign debt restructuring
process. 170

The IMF did discuss the possibility of creating an international
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (an SDRM) in the early
2000s; however, no further action has been taken to implement such
a body. 171 In part, the plan for a comprehensive international
cooperative structure failed due to insurmountable political
constraints that stem from getting sovereign states and the global
financial market, all with various and sometimes competing interests,
to agree on a "vast global legal scheme." 172 It is quite possible that a
plan would fail again today, and some argue that an ambitious
"macrolevel policy proposal" should be scraped in favor of smaller
piecemeal steps. 17 3 The same political constraints exist today that
prevented the implementation of the SDRM before, but the need for a

Press Release, General Assembly, Proposal for Sovereign Debt
165.
Restructuring Framework Among 6 Draft Texts Approved by Second Committee, U.N.
Press Release GA/EF/3417 (Dec. 5, 2014).
Trindle, supra note 74.
166.
Id.
167.
Press Release, General Assembly, Proposal for Sovereign Debt
168.
Restructuring Framework Among 6 Draft Texts Approved by Second Committee, supra
note 165.
See Hagan, supra note 129, at 344-45 (discussing the benefits of basing a
169.
structure in the IMF, including the fact that a large number of countries are already
signatories).
See Pottow, supra note 23, at 239 (discussing the benefits of the United
170.
Nations staffing an international sovereign debt board).
Muse-Fisher, supra note 21, at 1708.
171.
Roubini, supra note 6, at 8.
172.
Pottow, supra note 23, at 235-36 (proposing the creation of a certification
173.
board for sovereign debt restructuring).
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framework has reached critical heights in the face of strong holdouts
and developing and emerging democracies' continued risk of
174
default.
In September of 2014, the IMF released other limited proposals
to constrain holdout funds' power to block sovereign debt
restructuring. 1 75 The proposals mainly focused on changes that could
be made to the contractual framework of sovereign debt
restructuring, suggesting reliance on stronger collective action
clauses and modifying the boilerplate pari passu clauses that caused
so much trouble for Argentina. 176 Although contractual clauses may
improve the situation marginally, these ex-ante solutions will not
drastically change the restructuring process itself-the stage at
which the problems with holdouts tend to arise. 177 No sovereign debt
restructuring process is the same, so any solution that is purely exante will be insufficient because any determination about what is fair
or just in one restructuring may not be applicable to another-there
are simply too many variables to fully correct the vulture fund
problem in sovereign debt restructuring through changes to contract
language. 178 Contract clauses are written long before there is any
shadow of a default looming and cannot fully capture the needs and
unique circumstances of each individual sovereign default. While
these suggestions can serve to reduce future conflicts, they do not
address the need for an international framework, which would
resolve disputes that do arise from holdout fund litigation after a
restructuring has failed. 179
Similar to the IMF's proposals, the International Capital
Markets Association, a trade group of banks, brokers, and investors,
has proposed contractual terms that would erect barriers to vulture
fund attempts to impede the restructuring process. 180 These include
updated model collective action clauses and pari passu clauses for use

Roubini, supra note 6, at 8.
174.
See generally INT'L MONETARY FUND, STRENGTHENING THE CONTRACTUAL
175.
FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING (Oct. 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/ 2014/090214.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GK9V-U65T] (archived Oct. 4, 2015) (discussing some of the proposed
solutions to the sovereign debt crisis).
176.
See generally id. (describing the proposed policies of the IMF).
See Roubini, supra note 6, at 8 (evaluating proposed solutions to the
177.
sovereign debt restructuring problem).
178.
See Pottow, supra note 23, at 240-41 (discussing the role of a board in
sovereign debt restructuring).
179.
See generally Roubini, supra note 6 (discussing the global crisis in
sovereign debt restructuring).
See
Sovereign Debt Information, INT'L CAPITAL MK'T ASS'N,
180.
http:nwww.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Informationl [http://perma.cc/NL2LVDD5] (archived Oct. 4, 2015) (providing proposals for sovereign debt restructuring).
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in sovereign bonds, with the goal of facilitating restructuring when
18 1
necessary and preventing holdouts from blocking the process.
In September 2015, the UN General Assembly took an important
step by passing a resolution listing basic principles for the
restructuring of sovereign debt. 18 2 Among those principles is the idea
that sovereign states should be immune from litigation in domestic
courts over sovereign debt. 183 The United States, again
demonstrating an unwillingness to support any sort of international
mechanism to address sovereign defaults, voted against the
18 4
resolution.
While the General Assembly's principles demonstrate a
commitment to the idea that the current approach to sovereign debt
restructuring needs to be changed, these types of resolutions are not
binding. An international authority is necessary to implement these
principles. The need for an international body is most pressing in
cases involving developing countries that cannot afford drawn-out
litigation with holdout funds to resolve disputes over the meaning of
those contract terms. 185 Both creditors and debtors would greatly
benefit from the predictability and organization of an international
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, and the mere existence of
such a body would likely encourage parties to create mutually
agreeable deals without the need for the body to intervene. 186 One
possibility is that such a body could take the form of an international
sovereign debt arbitration court, similar to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration or the International Court of Arbitration.
One of the initial problems with sovereign defaults is thatwhile a quick resolution would be the preferred outcome-countries
often postpone entering default longer than they should. 187 Due to
the nature of sovereign assets, it is not always immediately clear
when a sovereign state's debt has exceeded its assets. 188 Additionally,
sovereign states will be hesitant to enter into the restructuring
process out of fear that it will be uncertain and chaotic. A quick and
early restructuring is preferable because it results in a more
predictable and orderly process. 189 Many experts believe that, in

181.
See id. (describing the new proposals for restructuring).
182.
Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Nations Approve Principlesfor Sovereign Debt
Restructuring,REUTERS (Sep. 10, 2015), http://uk.reuters.comarticle/2015/09/10/ukunsovereign-debt-idUKKCNORA2KU20150910
[http://perma.cc/4FJC-D7H4] (archived
Oct. 4, 2015).
183.
Id.
184.
Id.
185.
Trindle, supra note 74.
186.
Muse-Fisher, supra note 21, at 1709.
187.
See Hagan, supra note 129, at 307 (discussing the collective action problem
in sovereign debt restructuring).
188.
Id.
189.
Id. at 338.
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Argentina's case, the situation would have been better if the IMF had
"ended its support and pushed for debt restructuring much
earlier." 190 An important first step in an international system should
include a triggering mechanism that would allow a neutral third
party to determine when default and restructuring are necessary.
Some important key characteristics of any international system
include the ability to stay any pending litigation that has been
initiated in a nation's court system and an emphasis on impartiality,
transparency, and equity among creditors. 191 The benefit of an
arbitration court is that it removes the potential for "home court"
advantage that exists when these types of claims are litigated in a
particular nation's domestic courts. 192 Another way to mitigate
holdout funds' power would be to enact a policy allowing a "qualified
majority" of the creditors to bind a dissenting minority to the terms of
a restructuring deal, like an ex post CAC clause. 193
An international adjudicatory system would not only serve as a
check on creditors but would also ensure fair dealing by the sovereign
debtor. Particularly, there is a moral hazard concern with sovereign
restructuring, namely that a country may actually have the ability to
pay its debts but is unwilling to do so. 194 An international body could
also address the problems that arise when the debtor wholly controls
the terms of the restructuring, an issue highlighted by critics during
the Argentine restructuring. 195 Because it restructured its debt
independently, without IMF oversight, Argentina was able to
essentially demand acceptance of its unfavorable terms as a take-itor-leave-it proposition. 196 An international framework, however,
could empower creditors-through collective action-to structure the
terms of bond exchanges. Such terms would be binding on all
197
creditors and help to alleviate the risk of harm from vulture funds.
Because of the nature of sovereign debt, creditors are largely forced to
be passive observers rather than active participants, which presents a
large problem when a few particularly active creditors (like holdout
funds) take control and impede other creditors' access to their
restructured debt payments.
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HORNBECK, supranote 1, at 3.
191.
Argentina's 'Vulture Fund' Crisis,supra note 60.
192.
Pottow, supra note 23, at 242.
193.
See Muse-Fisher, supra note 21, at 1709 (discussing important features of
a sovereign debt framework).
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Pottow, supra note 23, at 241.
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See Hagan, supra note 129, at 336 (discussing this feature's integral role in
the IMF's 2001 proposal for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism).
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V. CONCLUSION

Judge Griesa's ruling in favor of the holdout funds came as
somewhat of a surprise to many in the international community.
However, the full ramifications are yet to be seen. The ruling
triggered fears of a weakened restructuring system, with creditors
finding a greater incentive to holdout and fewer reasons to participate
in an orderly and timely restructuring process. Furthermore, it
triggered concerns about the erosion of sovereign immunity with
more countries facing private litigation in domestic courts.
Argentina has been in sovereign debt limbo for a long time, and
this is unlikely to be the last time that vulture funds hijack a
sovereign debt restructuring process. Congress should take Judge
Griesa's ruling as an opportunity to enact legislation that places
limits on a vulture funds' power to disrupt the sovereign debt
restructuring process. With ramifications beyond Argentina's
economy, the ruling has demonstrated the pressing need for a better
international framework for debt restructuring, which the United
Nations has the opportunity to finally address, after previous failed
attempts by the IMF and others.
Sovereign defaults are incredibly costly and disruptive, and not
as easily coordinated as private bankruptcy in a corporate or
individual setting. However, the process can be made more efficient
and effective through a number of legislative and structural
improvements that will limit the ability of a small number of holdout
creditors to hijack the restructuring process for profit. Congressional
action prohibiting the use of U.S. courts for sovereign debt
profiteering, as well as the implementation of an international debtrestructuring framework, will serve to facilitate more predictable and
less chaotic sovereign debt restructuring in the future. While both of
these solutions require overcoming significant political obstacles-at
the national and international level-the fifteen years and counting
Argentine default saga has provided a stark example of why change is
necessary. Indeed, it has created an environment where the
international community is poised to finally take action.
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